## GREENS TRIBUNAL -- FEBRUARY 1983

NUREMBERG, GERMANY

It is very moving for me, and somehow not surprising, to be appearing before you on this subject in this city.

Some 20 years ago, working in the Pentagon, I was reading plans at night for contingency operations relating to Berlin-the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the war plans that would be executed if there should be a challenge to Western access rights to Berlin. It so happens that before that, at the RAND Corporation, I had read all ten volumes of the trials of the major Nazi war criminals---the Nurenberg documents. As I read these plans in the Pentagon, I had the feeling that I was reading exhibits in a future trial. They were best described as plans for escallatory genocide. Let me explain.

In the year 1961 I wrote the general nuclear war plans of the United States. Like plans before them and after them, they were first strike plans, for which the first strike weapons, about which we are hearing, were designed to implement.

To be more precise: I was the sole drafter for the Kennedy administration of their first top secret policy guidance for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the annual operational plans of the United States for general nuclear war. As such, I was of course privy to the previous plans, which it was my duty to transform to some degree. The previous plans, of course, remained in operation throughout 1961, the year of the Berlin Crisis. These Eisenhower plans provided for general nuclear war with the Soviet Union, as the sole strategy for the U.S. to employ in any conflict involving the armed forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, at any level, anywhere in the world. There were no plans for limited war, no plans for limited nuclear war; only plans for general war.

Something I did not know as I worked on these plans in early 1961, having been told--and believing in--the predictions of the missile gaps favoring the Soviets, on which Kennedy had campaigned in 1960....was that at that time, in 1961, a time when the U.S. had 3,000 bombers in range of Russia (2,000 intercontinental bombers, 1,000 based in Germany, Japan, carriers, and elsewhere) and had some 200 intermediate range warheads and

ICBM's, some based in the U.S., some in Italy, Britain, and Turkey -- 200 warheads (tape stopped?) ...

....in the attack, in the battle of Britain, the London Blitx. The Nagasaki bomb was the equivalent, in one bomb, of some 20,000 tons. Two million were dropped in all of WW II.

Carte blanche exercise, which involved a couple of million dead in Germany as an exercise result, in the mid-50's, shocking other people....in no slight way represents the meaning of the thermonuclear war which still remains at the heart of NATO planning. It was a war conducted, on one side, with nuclear weapons, and those were atomic weapons. It killed a couple of million people. The Russians have warheads on their largest missiles which amount to 20 megatons, 20 million tons of TNT, or 10 WW II's in one bomb. An SS 4 or 5 has a 1 megaton warhead targeted on Germany and other places which has one half a WW II in one warhead. The MX and the SS 18, with their multiple warheads, each have several million tons of TNT equivalence.

2 million people died at the death camp of Auchwitz, as a result of human-engineered slaughter. A single one of these larger warheads on the MX, the SS 18, the SS 4, or other American warheads, kills 2 million people if you drop it near 2 million people....6 million if you drop it near 6 million....Each of these missiles, on both sides, is an Auchwitz. The production of them is Auchwitz's.

the human problem. What the world has asked itself for 35 years What should the Jews of Germany have done, as the holocaust was prepared in the 30's? I ask this not to condemn or criticize the failings of anyone, but to learn from them, to try to reflect on what they would tell us today. For, faced with this problem

of the world, we are all Jews. Russians, Germans, premiers, presidents.

And another question: what should the Germans have done? Some did certain things, at the cost of their lives, at concentration camps. Do we not feel that more should have been done? But again, we must ask this question not to condemn or judge, but to try to hear what the Germans of that era would be saying to us now. For we are all--president and private, baby, general--we are all also Germans today. And we must learn from that experience.

The U.N. resolution of 9 December, 1981--U.N. Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, says this: Any doctrine allowing the first use of nuclear weapons, and any any actions pushing the world toward a catastrophe, are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the U.N. States and statesmen resort first to nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity. There will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who take the decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons...

As individuals, what is our responsibility? Referring to the concept of the immunity of non-combatants, and the certainty which is at the heart of just war theory, in Catholic theory, and of international law, to which these nations refer: the Catholic bishops in the U.S. are about to release a document, the draft of which has been released. It says this: Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets. generals here may or may not know what I as an American do know, as to the targeting of American strategic weapons as it has always been. It has always included every major city in the Soviet Union. And as early as 1961 and to this day, when I drafted the question for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the President to ask: "How many Russian and Chinese (who were also targeted) will die if your NATO and U.S. plans are carried out?", they had an answer. The answer was 325 million people immediately, not counting the people who would be wiped out

in Finland, Austria, Japan, Afganistan, Pakistan--neighboring countries who would be wiped out by fallout from our own weapons, even if not a single warhead fell on their territory. The total human cost, including the effect of Russian retaliation, could not have been less than 600 million people--this to be measured, in Holocausts, 100 German Holocausts.

My mention earlier of the Final Solution was not meant rhetorically, even though not all humans would die. The Catholics, from this, draw the conclusion: we do not perceive any situation in which deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare, on however restricted a scale, can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be resisted by other than nuclear means. I hope the bishops of Europe are reading this document.

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....I have described. Again, the Catholics have a sentence which might have come out of the film <u>Gandhi</u>, and is not familiar, I would say, in past Catholic practice, although led by such people as Dan and Phil Berrigan today, many Catholics have learned the meaning. It is this sentence: (?)

To carry out orders of the kind these generals, as well as I know, is the current nature of NATO planning. The policies of the government must be changed, must be changed by our action. And I wish, finally, to pay tribute to those generals who are here today, who have learned, as I learned, to consult loyalties higher and broader than loyalties to a particular party or military superior or national state.

QUESTION: The first question concerns first strike weapons.

Do you remember yesterday, Professor \_\_\_\_\_ from Russia, saying that the Russians have no first strike weapons. How do you see this point?

<u>D.E.</u>: When I worked on nuclear war plans for the U.S., I managed to be unaware of the fact that I was working, truly, on first strike plans--in that case because I was unaware of the

actual strategic balance of that time, which has changed. one thing has not changed, which is that I am certain that most people, in all countries, believe to themselves that what they are doing is deterring nuclear war, and war; and manage to ignore all evidence to the contrary, because there is really no human--very few humans--who wish to accept personal or national complicity in the possibility of initiating nuclear operations. Nevertheless, this can be very mistaken. sense, virtually all nuclear weapons are first strike weapons in the following manner: if one nation chooses to go first, with nuclear weapons, it will end up using virtually everything it has, and to what the military believes to be "good effect." None will be left on the shelf because they are not suitable for first strike operations. In that sense, every weapon can and does contribute to the hoped-for effectiveness of that first strike. And that hope includes the possibility, however illusory (and it is illusory) of limiting damage to one's own country. For example, in 1961 all those weapons on the U.S. side were first strike weapons, although none of them had the accuracy we attribute today to first strike weapons. But there were no hardened targets on the Soviet side at that time. We now regard the proposed MX, or the current Minuteman III, as in particular terms a "first strike" weapon for two reasons. It has, on one hand, the ability to destroy any particular military target on the enemy side, the Soviet side hypothetically here, because of its high accuracy, weight of yield, and so It can destroy hardened missiles which now exist in numbers on the Soviet side. Second, it is vulnerable, which the Minuteman III in particular but the MX--this is also true of the Pershing, of the Cruise missile, which we also rightly call first strike weapons. As such, it must be used first, or it cannot be used at all, because it could not survive an opponents attack. And as such it invites attack, in the sense that the other side has the ability and the temptation to strike it before it might be struck in a crisis. In this sense then, in the sense in which the MX and the Pershing are first strike weapons, peculiarly raising the risks of war in

a crisis: the Soviet Union's silo-busting, highly accurate and heavy weapon, the SS 18, and the SS 19, must be regarded, to the identical degree, as a first strike weapon, in that sense. I am not talking here about intent, but about capability and the pressures that the existence of such a weapon would put on the possessor of it in a crisis--namely, to use it first before they lost it. This is also true of the SS 20, as it is true of the Pershing's. These are all first strike weapons, in the precise sense in which any American weapon can be so called. And as such, they lower the security of the S.U. which possesses them, just as comparable weapons lower the security of Germany and the U.S. when we possess them.

QUESTION: Then what, in your understanding, has made the German government accept first strike NATO plans?

D.E.: Obviously, I don't know enough really to answer that, but I can say that I have been intensely puzzled by that, since the late 50's and early 60's. It is an article of faith, just as we are told that the Germans asked for the Pershings (and there is some ambiguity about that)...but we are told that the Europeans have demanded a first use commitment in NATO, and indeed many officials have reiterated this...I have been puzzled for many years as to how they could do something so irresponsible, reckless, and criminal. So I can only give you my best guesses, over the years, as to how this could be explained.

First of all, of course, not to be invidious, I can explain it the same way I can explain my own participation (and perhaps the generals here) in those plans for some time. These are only for threats. They are only for deterrence.

But surely, we have learned--those of us who didn't know it 20 years ago have learned in the last 20 years of wars in the world--how threats require actions to increase their credibility, and those actions in turn make it impossible to retreat from those threats if the opponent fails to back down. Since opponents have failed to back down very regularly in the

last 5 years in particular, we can see such threats as a route to war. And perhaps these German officials have simply not faced that.

One other point I would like to make, though. A second point is that some of them, many of them, may not really understand that these are first strike plans in which Germany is now participating, by its nuclear war planning. There are two points in this answer I would like to leave, from my whole testimony here, that I think need saying in Germany. One is: German involvement in first strike planning does not begin when the first Pershing arrives. It began in 1955 when Germany joined NATO and the NATO plan.

You ask, how could that be? and let me say, I suspect first of all that many Germans do not realize that, even officials. Now, perhaps, if they listen to us, they will realize (or can think about it, and it will be for them to draw the conclusions).

One other point is the other second point I would most like to make here today. I have actually asked ex-German officials, former officials and a current official (no, under the last government) why they did not join former bosses of mine: McGeorge Bundy, McNamera, Kennan, in endorsing a no-first-use commitment. And let me say, the majority of nations in the world have, in fact, called for a no-firsst-use commitment throughout the world in U.N. resolutions. Germany, like the U.S., has officially voted against that. That vote should be changed.

But you are asking now, finally, why did they do that?

And the answer I got in both cases was what I have also heard in Berlin: You, as an American, do not really know what WW II was like. True. You must understand that for us, another WW II fought with non-nuclear weapons would be "exactly as bad as WW III." Thus, they are saying, the risks of WW III we are taking with these plans, even if it is a real risk, is to avoid WW II again—a more likely possibility, which is just as bad. Maybe many Germans do believe this. I wish, then, to emphasize as strongly as I can: that attitude is insanely divorced from the realities of the present world. How could people be so wrong? They are living in the past—not the past of 1945, but

of much later than that: the past of Carte Blanche--the past of the mid-50's, the past of atomic weapons. The war plans of the late 40's and early 50's, which called for hitting Russian cities and allowed for war in Europe, projected casualties of 1.7 million people in Russia and hundreds of thousands in Germany. That was because they were done with mere Hiroshima weapons. But the Nagasaki weapon is a weapon which is necessary as the trigger for an H-bomb---a thermonuclear weapon, a fusion weapon. Every thermonuclear weapon, of which at least 20,000 exist in the U.S. and S.U., has a Nagasaki bomb for its trigger. Every one. That is the explanation as to why a current carte blanche would show casualties in Germany and in Europe measured from 100-200 million people, not 1 million. Therefore nothing can be more important, empirically, than to excise this notion that to play with nuclear weapons is to run at worst the risk of the degradation of WW II. There is no comparison between that world and this.

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...that they will lose their jobs if they do not change that vote, as we must in the U.S.

I do not identify people...I believe there are people in all three parties who are in favor of changing that vote. In that sense, I am here to interfere in your elections as I am interfering in elections in my own country, where we must tell our people: our Congress will lose their jobs if they do not take away from President Reagan the monetary power to test and develop those weapons.

QUESTION: You speak very eloquently about the moral outrage which first strike weapons certainly are. And I wish that every follower of every faith and tradition would agonize \_\_\_\_\_\_as you have. May I ask you to reflect further on one of your metaphors in your analysis: should there be a distinction between Auchwitz and SS 20's and Pershing II's. Are we all Jews? Perhaps we may all be Germans. Genocide was viewed, from my perspective, as implying a forced connection. It was insidiously focused on the Jews as a unique people. And virulent as that flight of spirit

may have been, and still is (since it is my understanding that the protocols of the ultimate design is still being published by some \_\_\_\_\_\_)...it gives us some explanation--like being able to look at bacteria under a microscope and deal with it. How does one deal with the moral vacuum that aparently exists I can't look into the Kremlin, but you have given us some feeling of the Pentagon, where you have been. Could you comment on that, the apparent cold consideration of vaporizing humanity, without the same kind of virulence that existed where the Jews are concerned?

<u>D.E.:</u> That is a very good question, and I have reflected on it. I have to repeat, first, briefly, what I said earlier. I am sure that most Americans, Germans, French, Russians who work on these plans tell themselves, "We are preparing only contingency plans to support threats. Therefore, it is not our intention, and we are not guilty of a desire, to exterminate humans—unlike the Nazis who supervised the Final Solution of the Jews. But I have to say, that answer is self-deceptive. First of all, the threats are intended to be triggered not by the nuclear attack of someone else, but ....

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